Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean Water Act Practitioner\u27s Search for Ratchet Down by Graddy, W. Henry, IV
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2 
Article 2 
January 1995 
Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean Water Act Practitioner's 
Search for Ratchet Down 
W. Henry Graddy IV 
Reeves & Graddy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Graddy, W. Henry IV (1995) "Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean Water Act Practitioner's Search for 
Ratchet Down," Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 10 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol10/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean
Water Act Practitioner's Search for
Ratchet Down
W. HENRY GRADDY, IV*
In 1991 Professor Oliver A. Houck published The Regulation
of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act.' Professor Houck
noted that the Clean Water Act2 provided a variety of approaches to
address the problem of toxic water pollution and he assessed how
well these approaches were working.3 He found a number of short-
comings with the various approaches and he concluded that Con-
gress should "end the agony and fix a timetable for the elimination
of toxic discharges." 4
While Professor Houck was writing his analysis, I was trying
to apply various approaches contained in the Clean Water Act to
Yellow Creek, Elkhorn Creek, and Lake Cumberland, Kentucky.
This article will compare Professor Houck's assessment of the Clean
Water Act's toxic control strategies with my actual experiences.
. Partner, Reeves & Graddy, Versailles, Kentucky; J.D., 1975 University of Ken-
tucky; B.A., 1969 Washington & Lee University. He has been an active member of the
Sierra Club for 20 years, serving as Regional Vice President for the Midwest Region,
Council delegate, Chair of Sierra Books Committee, Co-chair of Sierra Agricultural Com-
mittee, and is currently Chair of the Mississippi Ecoregion Task Force. He is a member
of the Kentucky Agricultural Water Quality Authority and the Emergency Response Com-
mission. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Todd E.
Leatherman and Elizabeth R. Bennett, Reeves & Graddy.
' Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water
Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,528 (1991) [hereinafter Houck).
2 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993) [hereinafter
"CWA" or "Act"].
3 See Houck, supra note 1.
4 Id. at 10,560.
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I. OVERVIEW
Because I graduated from the University of Kentucky Law
School before there was an environmental law curriculum, my
education about the Clean Water Act has been crisis-oriented. Peri-
odically, I have been asked to use the Clean Water Act and the state
laws and regulations that implement the Act to try to accomplish a
water quality objective. I began by looking at the Act. The Act, as
written, has an elegance that becomes apparent after some protracted
courtship. The problem is the gap that exists between the Act as
written and as practiced. I will summarize the Clean Water Act's
approaches to restore, maintain, and protect water quality. I will
then review Professor Houck's observations about the Act. I will
then review the Act in practice in three case studies: the George-
town Wastewater Treatment Plant Number 2, discharging into
Lane's Run, a tributary of Elkhorn Creek; the Middlesboro Sewage
Treatment Plant, discharging into Yellow Creek in Bell County, and
the Russell County Regional Wastewater Treatment Plant, dischar-
ging first into Big Lily Creek and then into Lake Cumberland.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE CLEAN WATER Acr
The Clean Water Act is best understood in historical context.
What is today referred to as the Clean Water Act was enacted in
1972 as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments.5
The significance of the 1972 amendments cannot be appreciat-
ed without considering the water quality legislation which it amend-
ed. In 1948 and 1965 Congress attempted to address the nation's
water quality problems by protecting "uses." 6 Built upon what was
believed to be sound sanitary engineering advice that "dilution is the
solution to pollution," the national approach to water quality protec-
tion before 1972 rested upon a strategy of designating water bodies
for certain uses such as drinking water supply, recreational use, and
aquatic habitat, and then attempting to set water quality standards
that would protect the designated uses.7 Water quality standards
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972), subsequently renamed the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
6 Water Pollution Control Act, Ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 115 (1948)
and Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
Water Quality Act, § 10(c), 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. 1, 1965).
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focused solely on the amount of pollutant present in the water
column itself and did not consider pollutants that had settled into
the sediment or been consumed by aquatic life.' Under this ap-
proach, the waters of the nation were available for the disposal of
waste products so long as the designated uses, sometimes summa-
rized as "fishable, swimmable, and drinkable," were maintained.' 0
This approach, protection of water quality/use, was logical in con-
cept. In practice, however, this approach was unworkable. 1 The
most obvious flaw was that by the time a water body reached the
stage where it was unsafe to drink, would not support aquatic life,
or was unfit to swim in, there were so many contributors that enfor-
cement became impossible. 2
In passing the 1972 Amendments, Congress took a dramatic
new direction. First, Congress declared the zero discharge goal
regarding any pollutant into any surface waters. 3 Congress ex-
The focus on sediments is a dramatic shift from the exclusive focus on
the water column characteristic of water quality regulation for decades.
Because very small concentrations of pollutants in the water column can
settle out and become major problems in the sediments, the implication of
sediment quality regulation is that discharge limitations will have to be
strengthened significantly.
Katherine Fletcher, Protecting Puget Sound: An Experiment in Regional Governance, 65
WASH. L. REV. 359, 367 n.39 (1990) (citation omitted).
' See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the
Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 463 (1989) ("Sweeping, but piecemeal, federal
legislation in the 1970's aspired to create healthy air, together with fishable, swimmable,
and drinkable waters.').
'0 33 U.S.C. § 466(c)(3). This approach has been preserved in CWA section 303,
which requires the Administrator of the U.S. EPA or authorized states to designate uses
for their water bodies and water quality criteria supporting those uses (33 U.S.C. §
1313(c)) and to take remedial action when those waters fail to meet criteria (33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)).
" According to Senate Report 414, only half of the states had federally approved
water quality standards for some pollutants by 1970 and few were prepared to determine
water quality impacts for new discharges. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668-75. "The problems stemmed from the
character of the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects rather than
the preventable causes of water pollution." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resour-
ces Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). See also NRDC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1315
(9th Cir. 1990); Mark C. Van Putten and Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean
Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 869-71 (1986).
12 Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 11, ns. 39-42 and accompanying text.
'3 CWA, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Clean Water Act, "unlike its
predecessor program which permitted the discharge of certain amounts of pollutants, . . .
[clearly establishes] that no one has the right to pollute - that pollution continues be-
cause of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the nation's water-
1994-951
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pressly rejected an approach that would permit the discharge of
pollutants based upon the dilution capacity of the receiving wa-
ter.14 Instead, Congress mandated that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency would systematically evaluate the available technology
to treat wastewater and would establish uniform technology-based
standards, called "effluent limitations," for all dischargers from
"point sources" [CWA vernacular for a pipe]. 5 Recognizing that
technology did not exist as of 1972 to eliminate all pollution, Con-
gress then established a permitting system to authorize the continued
discharge of pollutants while the nation improved its wastewater
treatment capabilities.1 6 The permit was called the National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.17 The Act
provided that the Environmental Protection Agency could delegate
the permitting authority to states.' It reaffirmed what had been
recognized as a parmership approach to water quality between the
federal government, state governments and local governments.'9
The Act rested upon the concept of "technology forcing"
statutory requirements. 20  The Environmental Protection Agency
was required to survey all categories of industrial dischargers and
publish the level of treatment technology that was currently achiev-
able, with more commonplace technologies expected for existing
facilities and more innovative and effective technologies for new
ways for the purpose of disposing of wastes." 1972 S. Rep., reprinted in A Legislative
History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
at 1460 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also Natural Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
"4 "The conference substitute specifically bans pollution dilution as an alternative to
waste treatment." S. CoNF. REP. No. 1236, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 2
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3778 (1972).
is See generally Richard A. Phelps, The Incredible, Elastic Yardstick Measuring
Compliance with Wastewater Discharge Standards, 31 A. F. L. REV. 105, 105-06 (1989).
16 CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
"7 CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(-
I)(A). The NPDES permit typically contains numerical limitations on the amount of mass
loading (lbs/day) and concentrations (mg/l) of specific pollutants which may be dis-
charged into the nation's waters. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976).
"a CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). For further discussion of this federal-state
partnership, see Van Putten and Jackson, supra note 11, at 872-73.
'9 CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
20 NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Thus, the most salient
characteristics of this statutory scheme, articulated time and again by its architects and
embedded in the statutory language, is that it is technology forcing.").
[VOL. 10:2
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facilities.2  This technology-based requirement was expected to
constantly "ratchet down" to achieve zero discharge.22 As new and
better treatment technologies proved out and became more widely
available and economical, industry would be required to implement
them, hence the term "technology forcing." However, at any point
in time, the technology standard would be applied uniformly to all
similar dischargers nationwide without regard for the dilution po-
tential of the receiving water, referred to as assimilative capacity. 3
Congress did not scrap the "use designation/water quality stan-
dard" approach that preceded 1972. Instead, this approach was
retained by Congress which designated water quality standards and
use protection as the measuring sticks to determine how well the
effluent limitation/technology-based approach worked. Under the
Act, the method for pollution prevention and elimination would be
the application of effluent limitations.24 Water quality would be a
measure of program effectiveness and performance, not a means of
elimination and enforcement.' The Act provided that where efflu-
ent limitations based on technology standards were not sufficient to
maintain or restore impaired designated uses, EPA or the states were
authorized to impose more stringent requirements on dischargers in
order to meet water quality goals.
26
The Clean Water Act also addressed toxic pollutants, declaring
the national policy to prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants "in
toxic amounts."' In doing so, the Act created two (and now three)
worlds of pollutants: so-called "conventional" pollutants such as
total suspended solids (TSS), pH, temperature, and biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD); and "toxic pollutants," generally referring
to all other pollutants, until the 1987 amendments created a third
category.28 The Act mandated that EPA would develop water qual-
21 CWA § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314.
2 Houck, supra note I at 10,542 ("New BATs [best available technology] would
constantly ratchet down on permitted levels, until, within our lifetimes, the 'zero dis-
charge' goals of the Clean Water Act were achieved.").
'3 CWA § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1972) and 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 189.
' "Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the
application of effluent limitations." Van Putten and Jackson, supra note 11, at 870 n.33.
25 S. REP. No. 414, supra note 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, at 3675.
2 CWA § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 and CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. See also
S. REP. No. 414, supra note 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, at 3675.
27 CWA § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
28 CWA § 301(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g). This section allows requirements for the
discharge of certain "nonconventional" pollutants from point sources to be modified
1994-95]
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ity standards (discharge limits) for all toxic pollutants, identifying
certain health-related factors that EPA must consider. 9
In addition to the "technology forcing" requirements imposed
upon all dischargers holding an NPDES permit, the Clean Water
Act imposed certain requirements on those facilities which proposed
to discharge their wastewater into a permitted facility. Such "indi-
rect dischargers" were required to pretreat their wastewater before
discharging it into a permitted facility to make sure that their
wastewater did not impair the operations of the permitted facility or
pass through the permitted facility without adequate treatment so as
to cause the permitted facility to violate its permit.30 The facilities
holding a discharge permit were required to develop their own
pretreatment programs and issue pretreatment permits to those indi-
rect dischargers establishing limits for discharges into the permitted
facility.31 The Environmental Protection Agency or the authorized
state remains responsible for supervising and approving municipal
pretreatment programs.'
Most observers agree that the nation has made substantial
progress in treating human waste.33 However, the Clean Water Act
has not adequately addressed other water quality problems such as
water pollution resulting from so-called "nonpoint sources," such as
urban or agricultural runoff, nor has it adequately protected ground-
water resources. 34 The Act has not adequately monitored and pro-
tected sediment, and according to Professor Houck and others, the
evidence that the Clean Water Act has improved the toxic condition
of the nation's waters is inconclusive.35
under conditions where such a modification would not interfere with attaining the
"fishable-swimmable" standard. The 1987 amendments identified ammonia, chlorine, color,
iron and total phenols as nonconventional pollutants.
29 CWA § 307(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (factors to be considered are the "toxicity
of the pollutant, its persistence, [and its] degradability").
o CWA § 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b).
3' CWA § 402(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8).
32 Id.
" The Clean Water Act has resulted in a massive investment of federal money at
the local level to improve the waste treatment capabilities of cities, towns and industries
across the country. Clean Water Act section 201 provides for federal assistance in the
construction of new sewage treatment plants where the grant applicant has demonstrated
need and provided a waste treatment management plan utilizing best practicable technol-
ogy. CWA § 201, 33 U.S.C. § 1281.
3 See CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (containing requirements for point source
discharge only). See also Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
Groundwater and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited, 19 ENVrL. L. 807
(1989).
" Professor Houck cites comments by Sen. Stafford that an estimated 14,000
[VOL. 10:2
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III. PROFESSOR HOUCK'S REVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER AcT's
Toxic POLLUTANT STRATEGIES
Professor Houck identifies the Clean Water Act's strategies for
addressing toxics as falling into the following six categories: receiv-
ing water quality standards, health based standards, technology
standards, regulation of toxic hot spots, whole effluent toxicity
testing, and biological criteria. 6 His analysis begins by noting the
Clean Water Act prohibits discharge of toxics "in toxic amounts.,
37
He observes that the phrase "in toxic amounts" is the flaw in the
Act because it presumes that we first are able to determine what
"toxic amounts" are and then that we will act on that knowledge in
the "rare event we can make the call. '38 He states that neither as-
sumption is correct.3 9 He grudgingly acknowledges that there is a
silver lining in the Clean Water Act's "multiple warhead" approach
to toxic pollution, that the accumulation of approaches may have the
effect of encouraging industries to reduce toxic discharge, if only to
avoid the burden of compliance.' Beyond this faint praise, he
finds little in practice to applaud. In discussing the shortcomings of
the various specific approaches, he criticizes the pre-1972 receiving
water quality standards approach," concluding that as a nation we
were simply asking science to do more than science could deliv-
er.
42
Upon enactment of the 1972 amendments, it fell upon EPA to
establish health-based standards for toxic pollutants. However, ac-
cording to Professor Houck, the Environmental Protection Agency
never really got started in the regulation of toxic substances under
stream miles, 638,000 acres of lakes and 900 square miles of estuaries have acute toxic
problems, made as part of the legislative history of the Water Quality Act of 1987.
Houck, supra note 1 at 10539. See also GAO Report, Water Pollution: Stronger Efforts
Needed By EPA To Control Toxic Water Pollution, July, 1991 (referencing EPA estimate
that 554.7 million pounds of toxic pollutants were discharged to surface waters in 1987.)
GAO/RCED-91-154 at 8.
36 Houck, supra note 1 at 10,528.




41 Id. "At this level too, dissecting a water column into 'acceptable' components of
arsenic, mercury, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), we begin to appreciate the awe-
some hubris of the exercise - that a living water system can be so dissected and that
we can ever, with any confidence, pick its numbers." Id. at 10,530.
42 Id. at 10,529.
1994-95]
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section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act. 43 Ultimately, to settle
litigation brought by the Natural Resources and Defense Council,"
the Environmental Protection Agency "agreed to evaluate identified
categories of toxins, since known as 'priority pollutants' . . . and to
regulate them on the basis of 'best available technology.' This com-
promise was incorporated ... into the Clean Water Act of 1977 as
a new section 307(a)(1)." 45 Professor Houck summarizes the status
of health standards as follows:
The unhappy fact is that, even today, decades past the health-
based provisions of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Toxic
Substances Control Act... we are unable to make health-based
decisions with any confidence. The literature on risk-benefits
analysis - legal, scientific, and otherwise - fills libraries. Entire
conferences are devoted to explaining its mysteries.
6
In the face of the overwhelming scientific uncertainty, he concludes,
"For better or for worse, we have shifted our faith from science to
engineering."
Professor Houck then discusses the Environmental Protection
Agency's development of technology-based standards. He notes
that the Environmental Protection Agency began ambitiously and
enjoyed a series of favorable rulings in court, but the Agency then
appeared to run out of gas.' Certain industries today have very
strict technological requirements and other industries or associations,
notably the Chemical Manufacturing Association, have been able to
block the development of more stringent technology-forcing require-
ments.49
Professor Houck then discusses the 1987 amendments to the
Clean Water Act, identified as the Water Quality Act of 198750,
stating: "It is indeed ironic that we must now warn people against
consuming fish caught in many areas cleansed of conventional pol-
43 See Id. at 10,533-34.
44 NRDC v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See Houck, supra note 1, at
10,534.
Houck, supra note 1 at 10,534-35 (citations omitted).
Id. at 10,535 (citations omitted).
4 Id. at 10,536.
4' See id. at 10,540.
' Id. at 10,540 ("No additional categories had been proposed. No additions to the
list of regulated 'priority pollutants' were proposed. No revisions were proposed to up-
grade standards from those set, in some cases, ten years before. Each of these shortcom-
ings was becoming an embarrassment.").
" Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
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lutants but which are contaminated by toxic pollutants to the point
that they pose a potential health threat to those who eat them."'"
The 1987 amendments attempted to jump start both the tech-
nology-forcing approach and the water quality standards approach.
In addition, Congress added a new strategy, the "toxic hot spots"
approach, directing states and EPA to go beyond best available
technology (BAT) where necessary. 2 This approach was made part
of the Clean Water Act Section 304.53 Professor Houck then dis-
5 Houck, supra note 1, at 10,539 (quoting Legislative History at 1305).
52 The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported as follows:
In the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress recognized the
pervasiveness of toxins when it set as national policy the toxic discharges
in toxic amounts be prohibited. The legislation reported by the Committee
brings us closer to that goal by . . . the establishment of a 'beyond-BAT'
program which will require direct dischargers to install more stringent clean
up technology if the best available technology [BAT] requirements set by
EPA are not sufficient to meet state water quality standards because of
toxic pollutants.
S. REP. No. 09-50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
CWA § 304(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) states:
(1) State list of navigable waters and development of strategies. Not later
than 2 years after February 4, 1987, each State shall submit to the Ad-
ministrator [of EPA] for review, approval, and implementation under this
subsection -
(A) List of those waters within the State which after the application
of effluent limitations required in the Section 1311(b)(2) of this title
cannot reasonably be anticipated to attain or maintain (i) water
quality standards for such waters reviewed, revised or adopted in
accordance with section 1313(c)(2)(B) of this title, due to toxic
pollutants, or (ii) that water quality which shall assure protection of
public health, public water supply, agricultural and industrial uses
and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of
shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and
on the water;
(B) List of all navigable waters in such State for which the State
does not expect the applicable standards under Section 1313 of this
Title will be achieved after the requirements of sections 1311(nb),
1316, and 1317(b) of this title are met, due entirely or substantially
to discharges from point sources of any toxic pollutants listed pur-
suant to Section 1317(a) of this title;
(C) For each segment of navigable waters included on such lists, a
determination of the specific point source discharging any such toxic
pollutant which is believed to be preventing or impairing such water
quality and the amount of each such toxic pollutant discharge by
each such source; and
(D) for each such segment, an individual control strategy which the
State determines will produce a reduction in the discharge of toxic
pollutants from point sources identified by the State under this para-
graph through the establishment of effluent limitations under section
J. NAT. REsouRCES & ENVTL. L.
cusses the impact of EPA's new federalism during the 1980-90s and
the effect such EPA deference had in the case of dioxin. 4 He
notes that even with this chemical, the most lethal chemical ever
produced, the Environmental Protection Agency has not been able to
provide effective health-based, water quality-based, or technology-
based solutions.55
Professor Houck then discusses the strategy of "whole effluent
toxicity," which he refers to as "a reality check. 56 He compares it
to the miners' canary to determine if the other strategies are accom-
plishing their objectives.57 Finally, he reviews the biological crite-
ria strategy as the "mystery guest," acknowledging that this new
arrival may have a darker side in that it may turn into an invitation
for industry to make the arguments that it made successfully prior to
1972 that "our discharges aren't harming anything."58 He reaches
the following conclusion that:
The objective of the Clean Water Act was to eliminate pollution
discharge. Twenty years later, for even the most toxic compounds
known to man, we do not have a discharge elimination program.
Instead, we have six separate programs for regulating toxic dis-
charges increasingly based on concepts of determining "accept-
able" risk that characterized, and largely defeated, water pollution
control efforts prior to 1972.59
He concludes that so long as we debate the meaning of "toxic
amounts" the debate will continue "for the life of the democra-
cy." He suggests that we move on to an approach that focuses on
new technology standards or the better alternative of simply elimi-
1342 of this title and water quality standards under section
1313(c)(2)(B) of this title, which reduction is sufficient, in combi-
nation with existing controls on point and nonpoint sources of pol-
lution, to achieve the applicable water quality standard as soon as
possible, but not later than 3 years after the date of this establish-
ment of such strategy.
4 See Houck, supra note 1 at 10,549-54.
55 Houck, supra note 1 at 10,549.
56 See Houck, supra note I at 10,555.
17 Id. at 10,555 ("[W]e could simply take a sample at an outfall, introduce a few
local organisms and see what survived. . . .But when more than 50% of the organisms
die within a few days, at least we know that there is a problem with toxicity."). This
test is referred to below as "biomonitoring."
58 See Houck, supra note 1 at 10,558-59.
5 Id. at 10,559.
'6 See Houck, supra note 1.
[VOL. 10:2
1994-95] LET Us HOPE FOR SMART FISH
nating certain toxic discharges from certain sources."
IV. A PILGRIM'S PROGRESS
My discovery of the problems of the Clean Water Act began in
1986. In January, Federal District Judge Eugene Siler approved the
settlement between the Environmental Protection Agency and Yel-
low Creek Concerned Citizens and the City of Middlesboro and the
Middlesboro Tanning Company of Delaware. This settlement ap-
peared to reflect the Clean Water Act working as it was supposed to
work. Then in rapid succession came issues stemming from the
Georgetown Wastewater Treatment Plant #2 and the Union Under-
wear Facility in Jamestown, Kentucky.
A. Toyota and Georgetown Wastewater Treatment Plant #2
By the end of 1986 the Commonwealth of Kentucky an-
nounced the arrival of Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Georgetown,
Kentucky. The plant was to be located at a facility constructed by
Ohbayashi Corporation. As part of the inducement to Toyota to
locate in Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky agreed to
construct a municipal waste treatment facility, identified as
Georgetown Wastewater Treatment Plant #2, across Cherry Blossom
Drive from the Toyota site. This waste treatment plant would
receive all of Toyota's industrial and human waste water and very
little else. Georgetown would issue a pretreatment permit to Toyota.
Toyota would not have the responsibility of being a direct dis-
charger and would not be directly responsible for the quality of the
effluent discharged into the small receiving stream, Lane's Run.
Property owners downstream from the Toyota facility challenged
both the discharge permit for the sewage treatment plant and the
storm water permits issued first to Ohbayashi and subsequently
transferred to Toyota after construction was complete. The challenge
to the waste treatment facility permit was resolved by a settlement
which required the construction of a pipeline running parallel to
Lane's Run to locate the discharge point below the farms of the
three property owners who brought the challenge. By moving the
discharge point downstream, those individuals no longer had cause
to complain.62
61 id.
62 In retrospect, the discharge has consistently failed to meet the biomonitoring
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. [VOL. 10:2
The storm water permit challenge took a somewhat different
course. As a result of that challenge, I discovered the "policy" of
the Commonwealth regarding water quality63  and the
"nondegradation" regulation.64 I naively thought that these would,
in fact, work to protect the existing water quality in Lane's Run. We
challenged the design of the storm water retention basins construct-
requirements in its permit. This failure has resulted in six years of study to identify the
cause of the toxicity, without success. The state has allowed this toxic discharge to
continue unabated. Telephone Interview (March 2, 1995).
6 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.020 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1995). This section, en-
titled "Policy and purpose as to water quality," states:
(1) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Commonwealth to con-
serve the waters of the Commonwealth for public water supplies, for the
propagation of fish and aquatic life, for fowl, animal wildlife and
arboreous growth, and for agricultural, industrial, recreational and other
legitimate uses; to provide a comprehensive program in the public interest
for the prevention, abatement and control of pollution; to provide effective
means for the execution and enforcement of such program; and to provide
for cooperation with agencies of other states or of the federal government
in carrying out these objectives.
(2) The following are among the purposes of KRS Chapter 224: to safe-
guard from pollution the uncontaminated waters of the Commonwealth; to
prevent the creation of any new pollution of the waters of the Common-
wealth; and to abate any existing pollution.
6 401 KY. ADMIN. REOS. 5:029 § 2 (1995) states:
Section 2. Nondegradation.
(1) It is the purpose of these administrative regulations to safeguard the
surface waters of the Commonwealth for their designated uses, to prevent
the creation of any new pollution of these waters; and to abate any exist-
ing pollution.
(2) Where the quality of surface waters exceeds that necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, wildlife and recreation in and on the water,
that quality shall be maintained and protected unless the cabinet finds, after
full satisfaction of the inter-governmental coordination and public par-
ticipation provisions of the cabinet's continuing planning process, that al-
lowing lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important eco-
nomic or social development in the area in which the waters are located.
In allowing such degradation or lower water quality, the cabinet shall
assure water quality adequate to protect existing uses fully. Further, the
cabinet will assure that there shall be achieved the highest statutory and
regulatory requirements for waste treatment by all new and existing point
sources and that nonpoint sources of pollutants be controlled by application
of all cost effective and reasonable best management practices.
(3) The implementation of this section shall conform to 40 CFR 131.12 to
the extent allowed by KRS 224.70-100.
(4) Water quality shall be maintained and protected in those waters desig-
nated as outstanding resource waters according to procedures specified in
Section 7(2) of 401 KAR 5:031.
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ed by Ohbayashi for Toyota as not being adequate to protect the
existing water quality in Lane's Run. In the course of that ad-
ministrative challenge, the following interchange took place in a
discovery deposition on January 20, 1988, where a Natural Resour-
ces and Environmental Protection Cabinet (hereinafter "Cabinet")
employee gave these answers to the following questions:
Q:[Ohbayashi anticipated] discharging 5 milligrams per liter of oil,
they proposed to release from the ponds 5 milligrams per liter of
oil and yet your permit permits 10 milligrams per liter.
A.That's correct.
Q.The daily max of 15 milligrams per liter.
A.That's correct.
Q.So, there you gave them more than they needed.
A.Again, I reiterate my statement, these limits are that which is
needed to protect the environment. If they. . let me give you an
example, if they put in their permit that they have .00001 milli-
grams per liter of zinc to be discharged, we don't put in the per-
mit limit .00001. We put in a limit in the permit exemplary of
what the water quality regulations require, .047. So, just because
the facility reports something less than the water quality standard,
doesn't mean we hold them to that.6"
A gap appeared to exist between word and action. We, the citizens
challenging the Ohbayashi/Toyota storm water permits and their
counsel, concluded that we were not going to be successful in
strengthening the permit and we dismissed the permit challenge. We
had learned an ominous lesson.
B. The Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens, the Middlesboro
Sewage Treatment Plant and the Tannery
The 1986 settlement of the Clean Water Act enforcement ac-
tion brought by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Yel-
low Creek Concerned Citizens against the City of Middlesboro and
the Middlesboro Tanning Company of Delaware imposed certain
requirements on the Middlesboro Sewage Treatment Plant and on
the Middlesboro Tanning Company regarding the nature of its dis-
charge to the sewage treatment plant. The settlement obligated the
6 Waller v. Ohbayashi Corporation, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet, File No. DOW-12254-21.
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City of Middlesboro to complete construction of a new sewage
treatment plant. The settlement also provided stipulated penalties for
which the City or the Tannery would be liable in the event of fail-
ure to comply with the terms of the settlement.
By the end of 1986 the new sewage treatment plant was in
operation. However, both the City and Tannery had violated the
obligations of the Consent Decree and the Environmental Protection
Agency had calculated and demanded substantial stipulated penalties
to be paid by both entities. Nothing happened. A year later the
Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens, as intervenors, filed a petition to
enforce the Consent Decree. A month later the Environmental
Protection Agency filed its own petition to enforce the Consent
Decree. Negotiations commenced, whereupon the Tannery filed a
motion to modify the Consent Decree to authorize an increase in the
discharge of certain constituents including biochemical oxygen
demand and chrome into the new sewer treatment plant based on the
logic that the new sewer treatment plant could "handle" the
increased loading, meaning that the increased loading would not
cause the city discharge to exceed water quality standards. The City
and the Cabinet agreed with the Tannery's request to allow the
increased loading. The Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens fought
bitterly against the increase, arguing that the terms of the original
Consent Decree were to govern all future conduct and that Yellow
Creek had suffered enough from 20 years of abuse. After a momen-
tary pause, the Environmental Protection Agency decided to agree
with the City of Middlesboro and the Middlesboro Tanning Compa-
ny and the Cabinet, accepting the logic that the new sewage treat-
ment plant would be able to accept the increased loading from the
Tannery and still meet permit limits.'
' See U.S.A., Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens and Larry Wilson v. City of
Middlesboro, Eastern District of Kentucky, Civil Action No. 84-11. The Magistrate Judge
deferred to EPA's interpretation of the CWA and adopted EPA position as follows:
YCCC objects on the basis that these modifications will weaken the re-
strictions that were placed on Middlesboro and MTC in the original con-
sent decree. Even assuming that the argument of YCCC is true, the
Magistrate Judge finds that its argument is misplaced. The proper inquiry
is not whether the proposed modifications will weaken the terms of the
original consent decree, but whether the proposed modifications will pro-
duce a 'likelihood' or 'realistic prospect' that Middlesboro will violate the
act in the future. A violation of the act occurs if Middlesboro violates the
terms and conditions of its KPDES permit.
At EPA's request, the court approved the amended consent decree which removed
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As with the Ohbayashi/Toyota experience, the goal of the
Clean Water Act to ratchet down pollutants toward zero discharge
seemed to be far removed from actual practice. However, the best
was yet to come.
C. Big Lily Creek and Lake Cumberland: Copper and Salt
In late 1988 the public began to learn about a proposal to
relocate the discharge of the outfall of the Russell County Regional
Wastewater Treatment Plant (hereinafter "Jamestown") from Big
Lily Creek, a tributary draining into Lake Cumberland, to the main
body of the lake. This plan was proposed in order to "control" the
chlorides that were present in the Jamestown effluent because of the
contribution from Union Underwear, the major industrial indirect
discharger into that facility. This discovery began one of the most
publicized environmental disputes in recent Kentucky history. It also
provides an excellent demonstration of what parts of the Clean
Water Act work and what parts do not.
The Union Underwear facility in Jamestown, Kentucky ap-
proached the city about expanding its operation shortly after the
Commonwealth of Kentucky 67 enacted a numerical limit for the
discharge of chloride into the waters of the Commonwealth. The
chloride chronic limit68 was set at 600 milligrams per liter and the
biomonitoring requirements from the scope of the consent decree, deleted the specific
limit on chrome discharged by the Tannery in the consent decree and modified the
biochemical oxygen demand requirement in addition to certain other modifications that
the Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens perceived as weakening consent decree require-
ments. Magistrate's Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation, Yellow Creek Con-
cem Citizens and Larry Wilson v. City of Middlesboro, Civil Action No. 84-11 (E.D.Ky.
Sept. 26, 1991).
67 Kentucky enacted numerical limits for chlorides, which were promptly challenged
by the oil and gas industry in circuit court in Johnson County where an injunction was
obtained prohibiting the enforcement of these standards. Adams v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Johnson Circuit Court, Civil Action No. 85-CI-129.
The EPA then promulgated a regulation for Kentucky implementing these numerical
limits on March 20, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 9105 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §
131.34).
" "Chronic criteria" is defined as "the highest instream concentration of a toxic
substance or an effluent to which organisms can be exposed indefinitely without causing
an unacceptable harmful effect." 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:029 § l(e) (1995). "Acute
criteria" is defined as "the highest instream concentration of a toxic substance or an
effluent to which organisms can be exposed for a brief period of time without causing
unacceptable harmful effects." 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:029 § l(b) (1995). The effect of
setting water quality limits based on concentration is that a facility would be allowed to
exceed the 600 milligrams per liter periodically as long as all samples taken for the
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acute limit was set at 1200 milligrams per liter.69
The chloride limit presented Jamestown and Union Underwear
with a predicament because at that time Union Underwear was
discharging approximately 2400 milligrams per liter of chlorides
into the Jamestown sewage treatment plant, having a total mass of
approximately 32,000 pounds per day.7° In addition, there were
periodic complaints of highly discolored wastewater in the receiving
stream, Big Lily Creek. The following Division of Water inspection
reports were typical. The stream was observed as having a reddish
maroon color on August 28, 1988, a brown color on May 29, 1988,
a green color on May 6, 1988, and a red color on May 12, 1988.7t
Finally, as a result of the Water Quality Amendments of 1987, Big
Lily Creek was listed as a "toxic hot spot" based upon the discharge
of 1.12 pounds per day of copper.72 All of these pollutants
(chloride, color and copper) were caused principally by the Union
Underwear discharge into the Jamestown sewage treatment plant.
In September of 1986, a representative of the Cabinet met with
Jamestown and Union representatives and suggested a solution. The
representative advocated:
changes in piping including the extension of discharge pipe to the
lake. Mr. Baldwin stated that because of new regulations, every-
one would soon be required to pipe effluent in this manner and
the City of Jamestown should go ahead with plans to pipe dis-
charge at this point in time. At issue was discharge limits recently
set for chlorides and the need for dilution and diffusion of effluent
by piping to the main body of the lake (river channel) rather than
discharging directly into Lily Creek because the creek bed is often
month average below that limit. However, in theory, the facility should never exceed the
daily maximum limitation. In practice, even this limit is imprecise, because the daily
maximum can be calculated based on a composite of samples taken every hour, so that
excursions about the 1200 milligrams per liter limit could occur within a 24-hour period
but not appear as a violation.
'6 Numerical limits for pollutants may be stated as a concentration limit, typically
milligrams per liter (mg/1) or occasionally micrograms per liter (pg/i). These limits may
also be stated as a mass limitation (pounds per day). Concentration limitations may be
converted to mass limitations if the volume of discharge is known using the following
conversion factor:. Concentration expressed in milligrams per liter times flow expressed in
million gallons per day times the conversion factor of 8.345 equals pounds per day.
7' See supra note 69.
" Division of Water Inspection Reports.
n See supra notes 52 and 53. Letter from Greer Tidwell, U.S. EPA Region IV
Administrator, to Carl Bradley, Secretary, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet (June 2, 1989).
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dry and offers no dilution factor. Other than requiring the dis-
charge pipe, essentially no changes in the current system were
suggested. Costs for the pipeline to the lake were estimated at
$1.5 million with modifications at the WWTP costing an addition-
al $lM.
7 3
When members of the Louisville Chapter of Trout Unlimited
learned of this strategy in 1988, they became alarmed and feared
that this plan might jeopardize one of Kentucky's most important
trout resources: the hatchery at Wolf Creek just below the Lake
Cumberland dam. Even though the Cabinet had not yet issued the
draft permit, there was widespread public concern because Lake
Cumberland was a very popular and heavily used fishing and recre-
ational resource.
On April 14, 1989, the Cabinet issued a draft discharge permit
authorizing Jamestown to discharge chlorides at a daily maximum of
2531 milligrams per liter or 42,585 pounds per day. The permit
authorized copper discharges of .378 milligrams per liter monthly
average and .656 milligrams per liter daily maximum. 74 The permit
also included a biomonitoring requirement to measure whole efflu-
ent toxicity."s This permit feature would require that the toxicity of
the sewage treatment plant discharge be determined after the efflu-
ent was diluted with 68% pure water and 32% effluent.
Public hearings on the draft permit were held in May of 1989
in both Jamestown, Kentucky and Northern Kentucky. By this time
the Cabinet had received comments from over 10,000 individuals.
The public hearings were well attended. At both public hearings,
Union Underwear employees outnumbered objectors: Union Under-
wear employees were bused to the public hearing in Northern Ken-
tucky.
On October 20, 1989, the Cabinet issued the final permit with
the following modifications. The chloride daily maximum in the
draft permit of 2531 milligrams per liter was increased to a daily
maximum of 5062 milligrams per liter, for a maximum mass load-
ing was 87,170 pounds per day.76 The monthly average for chlo-
' Memorandum from Donna Harper, Lake Cumberland Area Development District,
to the file (Sept. 15, 1986).
74 The Final Permit determined the acute criteria for copper to be .0145 mg/l, and
the chronic criteria for copper to be .01 mg/i. October 20, 1989 KPDES No.
KY0062995, Fact Sheet p. 9.
75 See Houck, supra note i, at 10,555. See also supra note 56.
7 The final permit fact sheet recites the highest monthly value of reported dis-
1994-95]
J. NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L.
rides was now set at 2531 milligrams per liter or 43,585 pounds per
day. The copper limit was lowered to a daily maximum of .384
milligrams per liter and a monthly average of .176 milligrams per
liter. The biomonitoring test required 21 percent effluent and 79
percent pure water. With this permit, members of the public first
learned about two water quality concepts: mixing zones and zones
of initial dilution (also identified as ZID's).
D. Mixing Zones and ZID's
Mixing zones are areas adjacent to a discharge pipe where the
discharger would be allowed to exceed chronic water quality limits
provided that acutely toxic conditions do not exist."" The logic
behind mixing zones was that aquatic life would likely enter these
zones but would not linger long enough to obtain sufficient expo-
sure to chronic concentrations of the pollutants to have harmful
effect.78 Mixing zones were well established, having become a part
of the nation's water quality legacy before the 1972 amendments to
the Clean Water Act.79 The 1972 legislative history reflects the
Congressional recognition of the mixing zone concept80 and the
decision to phase it out.8 However, the legislative history also
charge to be 3,000 mg/1. See Final Permit, Fact Sheet, Attachment 1.
77 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STAN-
DARDS HANDBOOK 2-7 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HAND-
BOOK].
78 Id. at 2-8.
79 id.
o Id. at 2-7. See also Testimony of Senator John Sherman Cooper, stating:
Until now and under the 1965 Act . . . [tihe states have been called upon
to classify their streams and waters for agricultural use, industrial use,
municipal water supply, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. Then,
usually with the consideration of the "assimilative capacity" of the
receiving waters and with the determination of an appropriate "mixing
zone," an attempt was made to assign the remaining pollution or diluted
pollution to sources which were considered to be responsible for that pol-
lution. This was and is an inherently difficult procedure, and under the
1965 Act has been a discouraging slow process.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
DIVISION, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972 at 1034, 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972).
s' Senator Edmund Muskie presented a conference committee report as follows:
These are not merely the pious declarations that Congress so often makes
in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is literally a life or death propo-
sition for the nation. . . . These policies . . . simply mean that streams
and rivers are no longer to be considered part of the waste treatment
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contains evidence that the Environmental Protection Agency leader-
ship did not embrace this congressional decision."
Case law on mixing zones consistently upholds their use, often
with a recognition that mixing zones are controversial.83 Some of
the cases upholding the use of mixing zones involve fact situations
where Environmental Protection Agency's award of a mixing zone
accompanies a significant reduction in the amount of toxic pollut-
ants actually being discharged. 4
Zones of Initial Dilution (ZIDs) have a shorter history. In 1985,
the Environmental Protection Agency published the Technical Sup-
port Document for Water Quality-based Toxins Control (TSD). 5
Technical support documents are published without any formal
legislative, administrative or judicial review process.86  In this
document, the Environmental Protection Agency recognized that
there were two ways a state could prevent lethal conditions in a
regulatory mixing zone. First, "the state can prohibit lethal concen-
trations in the pipe itself or require high rate diffusers and...
compliance within a short distance of the outfall." 7 Under the
second approach a high rate diffuser would provide turbulent initial
process.
Id. at 33,693-4 (1972).
' Speaking to the House Committee on Public Works, EPA Administrator William
Ruckelshaus stated,
I am questioning the wisdom, not the appeal, of whether we as a nation
ought to set for ourselves a goal that we are not really sure we ought to
achieve, really sure we can achieve . . . you are promising them no dis-
charge. That may or may not be clear water.
Hearings on HiR. 11895, 11896 Before the Committee on Public Works, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess. at 322 (1971).
' See Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("The use of mixing zones is a controversial one. One leading commentator on
section 307(a) argue that the 1972 Act 'probably does not allow mixing zones at all,'
since Congress banned pollution dilution as an alternative to waste treatment."). See also
Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Administrator of United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
836 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the courts must give deference to the
EPA's construction of environmental regulations); National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v.
Envtl. Protection Agency, 719 F.2d 624, 651 n.38 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom, Chemical Manufacturing Association v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
" Hercules, 598 F.2d 91. In Hercules, Velsicol discharged as much as 7 lbs/day of
endrin into the Mississippi prior to 1972, while the permit before the Hercules court
limited the discharge to .005 Ibs/day. Id. at 98.
' UNIrED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED ToxINs CONTROL (1985) [hereinafter 1985
TSD].
I d. at xvii.
I7 d. at 34.
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mixing and will minimize organism exposure time."8 The second
approach relied upon "discharge-induced mixing" and involved
putting a nozzle or series of nozzles on the end of the discharge
pipe to cause the effluent to "spray" out of the pipe rather than
simply flow out into the receiving water.8 9 The "spray" would add
two characteristics to the effluent that were believed to effectively
"control" the toxic discharge. First, the spray would cause rapid
dilution so that high concentrations of toxic pollutants at "end of
pipe" would be mixed with the receiving water so quickly that
aquatic life would not have time to be exposed to acute concentra-
tions.90 Second, the propulsion of the effluent was believed to be
so forceful that it would push aquatic life away from the discharge
pipe, re-enforcing the conclusion that aquatic life wouldn't be ex-
posed to harmful effects.9'
Faced with the Clean Water Act mandate against discharge of
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts, the TSD writers offered this anal-
ysis: toxicity is a combination of three characteristics (a) concentra-
tion - how much of the toxin is present per volume of water, (b)
duration - how long this concentration will exist in the water; and
(c) frequency - how long aquatic life will be exposed to such con-
centration at such duration.92 Nozzles at the end of the discharge
pipe, called a "high speed multiport diffuser," would control the
duration, reducing the toxic concentrations to a diluted subtoxic
concentration as rapidly as possible, and the frequency effectively
propelling fish out of harms way so that "in toxic amounts" would
not exist in the zone of initial dilution.93
" 1985 TSD, supra note 85 at 67. See also the 1990 Draft Technical Support
Document at page 132 identifying two ways to prevent lethality and the 1991 Final
Technical Support Document at page 71 identifying four ways to prevent lethality.
89 Id. at 35.
90 Id. at 34.
9' Id. at 35-6. When asked in the course of another administrative hearing this year
to give his expert opinion about the turbulence theory of aquatic life repulsion to a ZID,
a Cabinet employee testified that the scientific community has not yet reached a firm
conclusion. He offered only his own anecdotal experience diving at Lake Cumberland in
the course of toxicity testing as the basis for his belief that the turbulence created by a
diffuser's discharge repels fish. See Tr. Vol. II at 209-11, 225-27, Hackett v. Eminence
Wastewater Treatment Plant, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and En-
vironmental Protection Cabinet, File No. DOW-21246-042 (January 12, 1995).
' 1985 TSD, supra note 85, at 10-12.
93 Id. at 32-35. The 1985 Technical Support Document (1985 TSD) acknowledged
some uncertainties, stating:
A regulator should consider prohibiting a mixing zone in situations where
an effluent is known to attract fish. In such cases, provision of a continu-
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Kentucky water quality regulations in 1989 contained express
authorization for mixing zones with some specific limits and condi-
tions such as requiring that mixing zones could not be larger than
one-third the width of the receiving body of water.94 The only
regulatory reference to ZID's appeared at one sentence in the mix-
ing zone regulations, stating that "A zone of initial dilution may be
assigned on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Cabinet. '
The appeal of mixing zones and ZID's to the permit-holder is
that these features allow the discharge of effluent that exceeds acute
criteria at end of pipe so long as the acute criteria is calculated to be
met at the edge of the ZID and the chronic criteria is calculated to
be met at the edge of the mixing zone.96 The permit for the City of
Jamestown proposed to create a seven-foot ZID and a 70-foot
mixing zone.9'
The opponents of this permit, including the Lake Cumberland
Trust, Trout Unlimited, Sierra Club, The League of Kentucky
Sportsmen and several individuals (hereinafter 'Trust" or "Lake
Cumberland Trust"), relied upon two central arguments, although
there were a number of other more specific objections in the course
of this challenge. 98 First, the Trust argued the failure to comply
ous zone of passage around the mixing area will not serve the purpose of
protecting aquatic life. A review of the technical literature on avoid-
ance/attraction behavior reveal that the majority of toxicants elicited an
avoidance response or neutral response. . . Six individual pollutants (co-
pper, cadmium, mercury, total residual chlorine, chloroform, and NTA)
were reported as eliciting attractive responses in one or more of the tested
species. . . . Frequency of exceedence is how often exposure above criteria
can occur during a given period of time (E.G., once every ten years)
without unacceptably affecting the community. Ideally, a dynamic model of
the exposed population would be used to select the frequency. This is
presently beyond our capabilities, so the choice of the exceedence frequen-
cy represents the best judgment of how often a population can be reduced
without affecting its viability.
1985 TSD at page 63 and at D-1. The 1991 Technical Support Document (1991 TSD)
provides less information concerning fish attraction/avoidance but includes the following:
"Temperature can be an attractive force and may counter an avoidance response to a
pollutant, resulting in attraction to the toxicant discharge. Innate behavior such as mi-
gration may also supersede an avoidance response and cause fish to incur a significant
exposure." 1991 TSD at p. 71.
' 401 Ky. ADMIN. REOS. 5:029 § 5(4) (1989) (prior to modification of the regula-
tion promulgated in 1991).
95 Id. at § 5(2) (prior to modification of regulation promulgated in 1991).
96 Id.
" See Lake Cumberland Trust v. United States Envd. Protection Agency, 954 F.2d
1218, 1220-21 (6th Cir. 1992).
" See Phillip S. Heeren v. City of Jamestown, 817 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Ky.
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with the nondegradation requirements of both Kentucky and federal
regulations, as well as Kentucky Revised Statutes Section
224.020.99 Second, the Trust argued that the permit violated the
Clean Water Act mandate against the discharge of toxic materials in
toxic amounts 00  and Kentucky Code section 150.460101
prohibiting the discharge of substances that may be injurious to
aquatic life." 2
E. Antidegradation
The Kentucky nondegradation regulation is substantially equiv-
alent to the federal antidegradation regulation. 3 The Kentucky
regulation requires that it be implemented in a way that conforms to
the federal regulation "to the extent allowed by Kentucky Code
Section 224.020. ",10 4 The federal antidegradation requirement has
been in place for nearly thirty years. 5 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has, however, failed to provide uniform guidance to
assist state implementation of this requirement.06
1992) (initial action challenging compliance with National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321). Opponents also challenged the adequacy of the design of the
pipe and diffuser claiming that the design would not work. Six months after the pipe
and diffuser began operation, the pipe ruptured and the pipeline floated out of the lake
requiring extensive repairs and substantial additional weight to keep the pipeline on the
bottom of the lake. See Andy Mead, Lake Cumberland Pipeline Resurfaces, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 30, 1993, at Bl, 3.
9' 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:029 (1989); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 224.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1978) (renumbered as KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 70-100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993)).
'0o CWA § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
101 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.460 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
102 id.
"e Kentucky's nondegradation regulation is found at 401 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:029
(1989) while the federal antidegradation regulation is at 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1995).
'0' 401 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 5:029 §2(3) (1989).
'05 A press release issued in 1968 described the requirement, stating:
Waters whose existing quality is better than the established [ambient water
quality] standards as of the date on which such standards become effective
will be maintained at their existing high quality. These and other waters of
a State will not be lowered in quality unless and until it has been affir-
matively demonstrated to the State water pollution control agency and the
Department of the Interior that such change is justifiable as a result of
necessary economic and social development and will not interfere with or
become injurious to any assigned uses made of, or presently possible in
such waters.
Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 11 at 895 (footnotes omitted).
"06 In 1982, the EPA sought to weaken the requirement so that antidegradation
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If Professor Houck's analysis is correct, the Environmental
Protection Agency lacks the will or ability to implement higher
levels of treatment technology so that "technology forcing" re-
quirements for the Clean Water Act have stopped "ratcheting
down," health-based strategies are overwhelmed by endless scientific
debate and the "hot spot" strategy has run its course without much
impact, 10 7 then by default the nation is back to a water quality-
based strategy.'08 If we are relying on a water quality-based strate-
gy that only concerns itself with protecting designated uses, then
this nation has effectively returned to water quality protection as it
existed prior to 197 2 .1°9 We will have recreated the incentive to
locate wastewater discharges in places where we currently have the
best water quality; places with the highest water quality will have a
greater "margin of safety" before a use is jeopardized. 10
The antidegradation requirement represents the only protection
left to maintain water quality by inhibiting the otherwise unre-
strained practice of locating discharges in areas with the best water
quality."' The antidegradation requirement recognizes that where
a margin of safety exists between the existing water quality and the
would only maintain existing uses rather than existing water quality. EPA Water Quality
Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234, 49,238-39 (1982) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 131). See also EPA Proposed Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes
System, 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802, 20,886 (1993) (discussing EPA withdrawal of this proposal
after extensive public comment).
1"7 Houck argues that, "If, from another perspective, ICS calculations are allowed to
include expansive factors for flow and mixing - variables that infect the entire water
quality standard process - the process could end up netting a good many fish . . . and
then releasing them." Houck, supra note 1, at 10,549. "For example, Union Underwear is
reported to be proposing to abate its discharge of copper and other toxins into
Kentucky's Lily Creek by a new pipeline that will convey these discharges into the
considerably larger Lake Cumberland." Id. n.330 (citing Huffman, Kentucky Lawsuit,
NAT'L WILDLIFE FEDERATION LEADER, Feb. 1991, at 8).
Section 304(1) was a one time requirement to identify and clean up the
nation's impaired waters - especially those impaired by toxic chemicals -
within an accelerated time frame. However, this goal will largely not be
achieved by the June 1992 deadline because (1) many impaired waters
were not identified and (2) only 529 of the 18,770 impaired waters identi-
fied are targeted for more stringent regulatory controls.
GAO Report, supra note 35, at 20.
"0 Houck, supra note 1.
109 Id.
110 Id.
... See Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042,
1052-57 (Ohio 1992) (distinguishing between the water quality necessary to protect a
designated use and the more exacting antidegradation standard).
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level where a use would be jeopardized, that margin of safety will
get two types of protection. First, certain water bodies that Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency or the state determines to be "outsta-
nding" the existing water quality shall be "maintained and pro-
tected.""' This is the highest requirement." 3 There can be no
degradation of existing water quality except for what is determined
to be a temporary lowering of water quality." 4 This requirement is
sometimes referred to as Tier III level of protection."5 It has been
criticized as a "no discharge" mandate, although it should be seen as
a "no discharge of pollutants at levels higher than background in the
receiving water" mandate." 6 Second, all other waters that have
water quality that is better than necessary to meet designated uses,
that existing "margin of safety" is to be maintained and protected
"unless . . . ." The "unless" is a long sentence that includes each of
the following: (a) the state finds, (b) after full satisfaction of the
intergovernmental coordination and public participation provisions
of the state continuing planning process, (c) that allowing lower
water quality is necessary, (d) to accommodate important social and
economic development in the area, (e) such lower water quality
shall still result in water quality that fully protects existing uses, (f)
in any case the state shall require the highest statutory and regulato-
ry requirements for all new and existing point sources and cost
effective reasonable best management practices for all nonpoint
sources." 7 These waters have been referred to as Tier II waters
and are also referred to as "high quality waters."''
8
The meaning of a Tier I water is disputed." 9 One interpreta-
tion is based on defining Tier II waters to include only those waters
where every parameter exceeds water quality requirements all the
time. Under this interpretation Tier I waters become all other
waters whether or not meeting designated use.' 2 ' Under this ap-
2 Id. at 1053.
113 Id.
IR' UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STAN-
DARDS HANDBOOK 4-1 (2nd ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
HANDBOOK].
115 Id.
116 Id. at 4-2 and 4-7. See also Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 11, at 897.
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proach, virtually all waters are likely to be Tier I waters because
most waters are going to exceed at least one water quality require-
ment occasionally. 22 This interpretation has great appeal to some
because it effectively removes limits on the use of the remaining
margin of safety for those pollutants for which that waterbody is
exceeding water quality standards.'23
The other interpretation of Tier I waters limits this tier to those
waters not meeting designated uses and it prohibits any discharge
that would contribute to that problem, effectively mandating no
discharge of the problem pollutant until the existing water quality
problems are solved and a margin of safety is created.12 4 This
interpretation will fit Tier II if the classifications are based upon a
parameter by parameter analysis.'2 Under this interpretation one
waterbody could be a Tier I water for certain pollutants and a Tier
II water for other pollutants. 26 Any proposed new or increased
discharge would have to be evaluated based on the characteristics of
the effluent to be discharged as well as the quality of the receiving
waters.
27
The value of the "necessity" finding for Tier II waters is that
this is the only specific technology forcing feature left. 2 The "ne-
cessity" finding means that the discharge applicant and the agency,
with the public participating, must investigate and implement feasi-
ble treatment technology alternatives that would prevent the lower-
ing of water quality. 129 This is called the antidegradation "alterna-
tives analysis."' 3° Until the Environmental Protection Agency can
rejuvenate the Clean Water Act's process of ratcheting down efflu-
ent limits, there is nothing else in the Act that creates an incentive
for pollution prevention. 3 ' All water quality margins of safety are
at risk.





126 Id. at 4-7 ("All parameters do not need to be better quality than the State's
ambient criteria for the water to be deemed a 'high quality water.' EPA believes that it
is best to apply antidegradation on a parameter-by-parameter basis.").
127 Id.
128 id.
129 Houck, supra note 1, at 10,541.
'30 See 1994 WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 114.
131 Id.
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In the Lake Cumberland permit challenge the Kentucky Cabinet
agreed that Lake Cumberland was a "high quality water." However,
the Cabinet sidestepped the alternatives analysis by concluding that
the lower water quality in Lake Cumberland would not be "signifi-
cant" and that the alternatives analysis was only required where
there was a "significant" lowering of water quality.
In the course of the permit challenge the Cabinet used three
different routes to find no "significant" lowering of water quality.
First, the Cabinet compared the lower water quality in Lake
Cumberland with the existing water quality in Lily Creek, saying in
effect what will be permitted would be no worse than what is actu-
ally happening. The fallacy of this argument was that what was
happening in Lily Creek was illegal. Next the Cabinet used an "as-
similative capacity" formula to measure how much of the margin of
safety would be consumed at the edge of the mixing zone. Unfortu-
nately, the Cabinet only analyzed for chlorides. In deposition, when
the Cabinet's formula was applied to copper for the first time, the
Cabinet's Water Quality Branch Director acknowledged that the use
of over 40% of the assimilative capacity was significant. 132 Final-
ly, at the hearing the Cabinet claimed no "significant" lowering by
calculating the amount of chlorides and copper that would be pre-
dicted to be discharged at the Lake Cumberland dam fourteen miles
downstream.'33 The Cabinet's determined refusal to require an al-
ternatives analysis was the most critical objection raised by the Lake
Cumberland Trust.
F. Toxic Pollutants in Toxic Amounts
The second part of the Lake Cumberland Trust challenge fo-
cused on the provisions in the permit that would allow acutely toxic
concentrations of copper and chlorides to be discharged at end of
pipe. This challenge also opposed the requirement that
biomonitoring be done in diluted effluent, 21 percent effluent mixed
with 79 percent pure water, in order to determine toxicity. The Trust
argued that Kentucky Revised Statutes section 150.460 prohibited
the issuance of this permit,'34 in addition to the Clean Water Act
132 Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Division of Water, File No. DOW-15497-21 (1991)
(deposition of Robert Ware at 48-57).
133 id.
" Section 150.460 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes states:
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prohibition on the discharge of "toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts."'35 Anticipating the Cabinet's reasoning concerning con-
centration, duration and frequency, the Trust challenged the scien-
tific justification for the TSD assumptions. The Trust called an
aquatic toxicologist who had published studies showing that copper
was a fish attractor at certain levels.13 The Trust also called an
aquatic biology professor who testified that current, chemistry of the
effluent, and the increased number of food organisms would tend to
attract fish and that there was evidence that channel catfish are
attracted to sodium chloride. The Trust called a professional fishing
guide who testified that striped bass would be attracted to turbulence
and that stripers had been caught at depths of 30 to 100 feet in the
area where the diffuser would be located. Another biologist testified
that the type of discharge including nutrient matter, the current
Use of certain substances and devices in public waters prohibited - Use of
explosives and firearms prohibited.
(1) No person, finn or corporation, whether acting in a private or public
capacity, shall place or cause to be placed in any public waters any sub-
stance that might injure, interfere with, or cause the waters to be unfit for
the support of wildlife. When any employee of a person, firm or corpora-
tion, in the course of his employment, places or causes to be placed any
such substance in any public waters, his act shall be prima facie evidence
of the guilt of both the employee and the employer, and either one (1) or
both may be punished as provided in subsection (7) of KRS 150.990. Each
day that this section is violated shall constitute a separate offense. This
section does not apply to employees or agents of the department acting in
an official capacity.
(3) No person, except employees or agents of the department, shall will-
fully place or attempt to place in any of the public waters of the state any
substance which has a poisonous or intoxicating effect upon wildlife.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.460 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995).
'3 CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3).
13 Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Division of Water, File No. DOW-15497-21
(1991). No witnesses at the Lake Cumberland hearing were able to testify about how
long aquatic life would feed on effluent from the diffusers, but all agreed the aspects of
the diffuser discharge would attract fish. See the testimony of Pearson, aquatic
toxicologist (Tr. Vol. VIII at 175-84) (noting that water current, chemistry of the effluent
and increased numbers of food organism all have a tendency to attract fish); testimony
of Gibson, aquatic biology professor (Tr. Vol. IV at 214-15) (that striped bass is attract-
ed to turbulence and stripers have been caught at depths of 30-100 feet); testimony of
Porter, fishing guide (Tr. Vol. VI at 194) (fish will be attracted to such an outfall as a
result of food sources, specifically algae and zooplankton); testimony of Birge, biologist
(Tr. Vol. VII at 7) (some constituents of the discharge, such as chloroform, have been
shown consistently to attract fish); testimony of Westerman, biologist (T. Vol. XIX at
113) (fish would certainly be attracted to the flow). Id.
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velocity, the difference in water temperature, the potential for fish-
ery habitat, would all likely result in fish attraction to the outfall as
a food source. Other experienced fishermen, a Fish and Wildlife
official, and biologists testified to the probability that fish would be
attracted to a diffuser as a food source.
In response, the Cabinet acknowledged concern about the in-
ability to answer the question of fish attraction/avoidance. They
acknowledged the lack of scientific studies in this area. The Cabinet
provided as justification that they would do extensive monitoring in
the area of the outfall once it was permitted in order to determine if
there was evidence of a problem at the earliest possible opportunity.
The Cabinet hoped there would not be a problem.
137
As noted above, the Cabinet had identified the City of James-
town as the facility responsible for a toxic "hot spot" and identified
copper in the amount of 1.12 pounds per day as the problem pa-
rameter. 3  As required by Section 304(1), the Cabinet submitted
the permit to Environmental Protection Agency as the "individual
control strategy" (ICS) required under Section 304(l). 13 9 The Lake
Cumberland Trust read Section 304(1) to require that the ICS must
actually accomplish a reduction in the amount of the pollutant being
discharged from the discharge pipe. The Cabinet claimed to have
accomplished a reduction by eliminating the discharge in Lily
Creek. However, the increased flow from the expanded Jamestown
sewage treatment plant140 and the permit limits for copper would
authorize the discharge of copper into Lake Cumberland in the
amount of 5.28 pounds per day.14' The Lake Cumberland Trust
argued that this ICS simply moved a toxic hot spot from a small
stream where it was easily visible to the bottom of a lake where it
would be out of sight.
137 See Lake Cumberland Trust v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, DOW-15497-21, Tr. Vol. XX at 50. The Cabinet representative testified:
We have tried to minimize and basically build a safe mechanism as we
know. Now, there are certain things that we don't know. We know more
today than we did two years ago when we started this process; and I hope
we know more two to five years from now when we have some other
information that we can make better decisions.
138 See supra notes 36-37.
13" Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d at 1220 (6th Cir. 1992).
'o From 2.5 mg/d to 3.6 mg/d. Final Permit, supra note 74.
141 Calculated from permit parameters, supra note 140. See 1994 WATER QUALIrY
STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 114.
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The Cabinet, however, disagreed. From the Cabinet's perspec-
tive, Lily Creek was an impaired stream that was not meeting its
designated use (it failed to support warmwater aquatic life, i.e. was
not "fishable") and it was a toxic "hot spot." After the relocation,
Lily Creek would be able to meet its designated use and would not
be a toxic hot spot. The pollutants would be in a ZID and mixing
zone 70 feet below the surface of Lake Cumberland. But since
Environmental Protection Agency and the Cabinet interpret that they
can ignore the water quality in a mixing zone, the 2.5 acre portion
of Lake Cumberland so designated would not result in the loss of
designated use status in Lake Cumberland and the ZID and mixing
zone would not be considered toxic "hot spots" even though the
permit would allow more mass of persistent toxic pollutants such as
copper to be discharged into the lake than had been discharged
previously into Lily Creek. The Cabinet and Environmental Pro-
tection Agency could both claim that water quality was improved,
designated use restored, and a toxic hot spot eliminated even as they
authorized a greater volume of pollutants to be discharged then the
volume that caused the problems.
Where the Environmental Protection Agency has failed its
obligation to ratchet down effluent limits and Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the State have failed to implement the an-
tidegradation requirement to begin closing the dilution loophole, we
are left to hope that the aquatic life will figure out that the food
source coming out of this sewage treatment plant discharge pipe
may not be healthy. We must hope for smart fish.
This statute-testing and emotion-laden situation on Lake
Cumberland has generated at least four legal actions. The Lake
Cumberland Trust filed a citizens' suit against Jamestown pursuant
to Clean Water Act Section 505142 in August, 1990.143 The Trust
also challenged the granting of the KPDES permit." A petition
for review of Environmental Protection Agency approval of the ICS
pursuant to Clean Water Act section 509'4 was filed in the Unit-
' Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
'4 See Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Envtl. Protection
Cabinet, 1992 WL 19070, at *1 (Ky. Nat. Res. Env. Protection Cabinet 1992).
', Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Division of Water, File No. DOW-15497-21
(1991).
1'4 Clean Water Act § 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369.
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ed States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in September, 1990.'4
One individual, Phillip Heeren, filed a National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) compliance action in October, 1990.'47
The results of these actions have held little promise for citizens
and fish. In January, 1992, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed the challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's
approval of the Jamestown ICS for lack of jurisdiction." On De-
cember 11, 1990, Western District of Kentucky Judge Ron Meredith
issued an injunction in the NEPA suit prohibiting the expenditure of
additional federal monies until Jamestown complied with the re-
quirements of NEPA.' 49 In December, 1991, the Kentucky Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet's hearing officer in
the permit challenge affirmed the permit in all respects as issued,
except he found that the permit limit for copper was not sufficiently
protective and remanded that limit for further proceedings. 50
On January 9, 1992, the parties reached a settlement agreement
that commenced a 12-month investigation of treatment alterna-
tives.Y The settlement agreement included a reduction in the cop-
per limit from .176 milligrams per liter to .149 milligrams per
liter.152 Union reported significant copper reduction from the use
of polymers at the commencement of the settlement negotiations. At
the end of the 12-month investigation, the investigating committee
recommended approval of the pipeline and diffuser into Lake
Cumberland, with Union and Jamestown under a continuing obliga-
tion to investigate treatment technologies. The committee found that
treatment technology existed that could reduce the copper and chlo-
rides from Union Underwear to meet permit limits but that there
was additional copper coming from the domestic effluent for which
the committee could find no available removal technology within
the 12-month time limit set by the settlement agreement.
'46 Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1992).
147 Heeren v. City of Jamestown, 817 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Ky. 1992); see also
supra note 98 and accompanying text. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370a (1995).
148 Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. EPA, 954 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1992).
1' Heeren v. City of Jamestown, 817 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Ky. 1992).
' Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Division of Water, File No. DOW-15497-21
(1991).
'" Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Envtl. Protection Cabinet,
1992 WL 19070, at *1 (Ky. Nat. Res. Env. Protection Cabinet 1992).
1' Id. at 7.
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The Lake Cumberland controversy began from widespread
public desire to prevent the location of a sewage treatment plant
outfall in the main body of a very popular lake. It evolved into a
controversy over process - does the public have the right to require
an investigation into available treatment technologies before a deci-
sion is made to construct a pipe and diffuser into the lake? 53 Stat-
ed another way, if Environmental Protection Agency is not going to
"ratchet down" the discharge of pollutants, will the public be given
this opportunity? Ultimately, the Lake Cumberland Trust was af-
forded an opportunity to investigate treatment technologies - but
only after the pipeline was constructed.
This controversy could accomplish a positive benefit if it re-
sulted in new procedures to affirmn the pollution prevention and the
public participation purpose of the antidegradation requirements.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence to date that this lesson has been
learned.
A Cabinet employee was deposed on October 5, 1992 concern-
ing the Campbell County treatment plant that receives Kahn's in-
dustrial waste water. 154 The County applied for a discharge permit
and identified the pollutant chloride as being present, with its high-
est monthly average reported to be 1310 milligrams per liter. The
Cabinet proposed to permit the discharge of 3064 milligrams per
liter of chlorides. The Cabinet employee was asked why this limit
was permitted. The Cabinet concluded that the antidegradation
"necessary" finding did not apply because the Licking River was not
a "high quality water." The employee answered that he recalled
getting a letter from Kahn's that projected the highest monthly
average they might expect to be 2414 milligrams per liter of chlo-
rides. He was again asked how he could justify a permit limit of
3064 milligrams per liter. He answered:
Well, this is like a monthly average value. So, we don't want to
put a permit limit ... we don't want to limit the permittee to
something that if he gives an exact value that he's going to be
discharging. You want the permit limit to reflect a little bit of...
you don't want them to be in noncompliance all the time. You
don't want to issue a permit limit that will not ... I don't (know)
153 See Lake Cumberland Trust v. Natural Resources and Envtl. Protection Cabinet,
1992 WL 19070, at *6 (Ky. Nat. Res. Env. Protection Cabinet 1992).
" Dierig v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Common-
wealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, File No.
DOW-18718-21.
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how to explain it.
Q51: Are you saying that you want to give them more than they
asked for?
A. Well, in a way, yeah.
CONCLUSION
The Clean Water Act was intended to begin a national effort to
reduce the amount of pollutants discharged into the nation's waters
until the nation reached "zero discharge," declaring that no pollution
is acceptable if it can be eliminated.'55 Clearly this was supposed
to be an ongoing process, always moving in the direction of less
pollutants into our waters.
Just as clearly, it has not happened. The most effective tool,
technology-based effluent limits,1 56 has not gotten past the first
round. Today, it is hard to find anyone working to "ratchet down"
effluent limits toward zero discharge.
Proper implementation of the antidegradation requirement could
help close the dilution loopholes and help implement effective pol-
lution prevention. To date, this requirement has not been properly
implemented. In many respects we are repeating today the mistakes
we made in the 1950's and 1960's. We can only hope that the fish
are smart enough to swim around our mistakes and survive our
failure to learn the lessons of water quality history.
" CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
'"' Houck, supra note 1 at 10,541 ("BAT under the Clean Water Act has probably
been the most effective pollution control program in the world in terms of producing
identifiable abatement - short of outright bans - if only because alternative programs
have proven equally burdensome and so much less effective.").
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